You see, this isn’t a brainstorming session — it’s a collision of fundamentally incompatible world views.
Paul Krugman
As a wise man recently said, failure to act effectively risks turning this slump into a catastrophe. Yet there’s a sense, watching the process so far, of low energy. What’s going on?
Paul Krugman
First, focus all attention on reversing the collapse in demand now, rather than on the global architecture. Second, employ overwhelming force. The time for “shock and awe” in economic policymaking is now.
Martin Wolf
OK, I think no regular reader of this blog could seriously suggest I have much sympathy for the sort of views you normally find being propagated by Italy's Finance Minister Guilio Tremonti, but when he starts to send out the kind of red warning light danger signals that he has been doing over recent days, then I think we should all be taking note, and when the republic is in danger, then its all hands to the pumps, regardless of who is sounding the alert. This is not a brainstorming session, it is a real flesh and blood crisis.
Perhaps few of you will have noticed it, but our erstwhile logician has been getting extremely nervous in recent days, and most notably chose his visit to Davos to indicate that he personally would look extraordinarily favourably on any move to inititiate the creation of EU bonds (for a brief explanation of why these are important, see Wolfgang Munchau's argument in favour of such bonds here. (Or the longer version here)
Italy's Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti has said he favoured the issuance of government debt by the European Union. "Now my feeling -- I am speaking of a political issue not an economic issue -- is ... now we need a union bond," Tremonti said at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Countries in the euro zone currently issue sovereign debt in their own name, rather than regionally. Bond traders concerned about the mounting public debt of Italy, Greece and Ireland have pushed down the value of their government bonds, sparking speculation they might be driven out of the euro zone.
Now why would he be arguing this? Well the state of Italy's own banking sector would be one part of the explanation, and the fact that the Italian government is in no position to mount a rescue operation on its own given the size of its existing debt to GDP commitment, would be another. In particular, and as I have been arguing, Unicredit - and its Eastern Europe exposure - is a huge worry.
Indeed the situation is now so delicate, that according to this Reuters report last week, Unicredit really doesn't know which government to turn to. The Italian one perhaps, or the Polish one, or "it could consider doing it in Austria".
Italian bank UniCredit is considering requesting state support in Italy and Poland, a source close to the bank told Reuters on Thursday. "The bank does not exclude possible state support in Italy and Poland," the source said on condition of anonymity. In an extract of an interview to be published in Germany's Handelsblatt newspaper on Friday, UniCredit Chief Executive Alessandro Profumo said the bank could consider "state support as insurance against unpredictable events." If the bank does seek state aid, it could consider doing it in Austria, for example, he added.
UniCredit SpA is considering asking for government capital amid the credit crunch, Chief Executive Officer Alessandro Profumo said. “State support as insurance for unforeseeable events” is conceivable, Profumo told Handelsblatt newspaper in an interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. A UniCredit official confirmed the comments to Bloomberg. Italy’s top bankers met with central bank Governor Mario Draghi last week to discuss the financial crisis, which has caused bankruptcies and government bailouts across the world, while stocks have plunged and credit markets have seized up. UniCredit and some of its rivals have tumbled in Milan since the start of 2008 amid concern about the strength of their finances.
Bloomberg 29 January 2009
The announcement that Unicredit was seeking state aid came on the same day that the bank admitted that investors had placed orders for only 0.5 percent of the shares they were offering in a rights issue. The bank received orders for a mere 14.3 million euros of stock out of a total of 3 billion euros, and the plan was to sell leftover stock in the form of convertible bonds, but even this hit a snag, as
The shares were offered at 3.083 euros apiece, or over twice what they were trading for in Milan at the time (around 1.408 euros). Shareholders, including Allianz SE and the Central Bank of Libya, are among those who agreed to buy the convertible bonds, according to the bank offer document. Shares of UniCredit have dropped 54 percent since October, when the rights offering was announced, amid concern the capital raising won’t be sufficient. But even the bonds issue is running into trouble, since Il Sole 24 Ore reported that Unicredit may raise only 2.5 billion euros rather than the full 3 billion euros because because investor Fondazione CariVerona, which holds a 5 percent stake in the bank, reportedly hasn’t received approval from the government to buy the securities, however, the reason they have not received approval may well be that they have not yet applied since the Italian Treasury, in what is a rather unusual step, said on Thursday announced that they had yet to receive a request from CariVerona to sign up for the bond issue. All this suggests, of course, that Tremonti's warning about an imminent bailout could be a piece of brinksmanship, designed to presssure CariVerona to stop playing "positioning" games and come up with the money, but irrespective of whether or not this is the case, some sort of rescue operation for Unicredit surely cannot be far away at this point.
And the fact that Bulgaria's Finance Minister Plamen Oresharski was running around last week assuring everyone that Bulgaria's banks have not asked for state rescue aid so far, and that the government is not worried about the banking system's health for now, is hardly helping to calm already troubled nerves. About 80 percent of the 29 commercial banks operating in Bulgaria are foreign-owned, with the biggest lenders being run by Italy's UniCredit, Hungary's OTP Bank, Greece's National Bank of Greece and Austria's Raiffeisen.
And only today Tremonti has warned that the announcement of more EU bank bailouts is imminent, and maybe as early as this weekend.
European governments may have to bail out more banks as soon as “this weekend,” Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti said today. “So far in Europe there have been more than 30 bank bailouts and I can’t rule out that there will be more this week- end,” Tremonti said, speaking at a press conference after today’s Cabinet meeting in Rome.
So how should we address this danger, imminent or otherwise? At this point in time I have four proposals:
a) The creation of EU bonds
b) The introduction of quantitative easing by the ECB (quantitative easing is the monetary policy which is currently being applied in both the US and Japan, and probably soon in the UK too).
c) Letting those members of the East who want to join the eurozone immediately do so.
d) A new "pact" - one which would be much, much stronger than the old Stability and Growth Pact - to be signed by all countries who enter the EU bond system, a pact which gives direct fiscal remedies to Brussels in the event of non-compliance together with a substantial dose of effective control over the economies of individual countries - since nothing, Mr Sr. Tremonti, ever comes completely for free.
Obviously all of this is quite radical, and indeed fraught with danger, but these are hardly normal times. In all of this (d) is obviously the most important part, as any protection given to EU member economies by the Union must be credible and serious. So no country could or should be forced in, but it should also be pointed out to those who chose sovereignty and remaining on the fringes to participation that they would run an enormous risk. Since almost all EU economies seem vulnerable at this point, anyone staying outside could rapidly see themselves exposed to the risk of forced default, since lack of protection is simply an invitation to attack. Letting ourselves get picked off one by one is not an appetising prospect (Latvia, Hungary, Greece, Austria, Italy, Spain, Ireland, the UK, Romania, Bulgaria.........).
Clearly those who wish to remain "dissenters" should have the liberty to do so, but they should bear well in mind that should they do so they could very easily end up in a group - possibly lead by Diego Armando Maradona - together with Yulia Timoshenko (Ukraine), Cristina Fernadez (Argentina), Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and (possibly) whoever is the new prime minister in Iceland, bankrupt, and without the aid of international financial support to help deal with their mess.
Perhaps readers may think I am being rather shrill here, and perhaps at this point Tremonti (for whom I have no afinity, elective or otherwise, see linked post above) is only playing brinksmanship, but if he isn't, and Unicredit is about to need bailing out, then push does quickly come to shove, since the EU leaders agreed on October 12 in Paris to bail out systemic banks, and Unicredit is a systemic bank. So will will need to know how they plan to stand by their commitment, and if they don't, well then everyone of us stands exposed, since credibility rapidly falls towards zero.
Maybe this is a false alarm situation, and Unicredit will not need bailing out this weekend, or the next one, but one day it will, and one day Spain's huge non performing loan and household debt default problem is going to need sorting out. So I think this is a line in the sand situation, and we are much nearer to having to make up our minds which side of the line we are on than many seem think.
To paraphrase Paul Krugman again, in flirting with the idea of whether the first to default should be Greece, or Hungary, we truly are flirting with disaster.
7 comments:
I've one question about EU bonds. Doesn't the Maastricht Treaty explicitly forbid the ECB lending to member governments? And wasn't this one of the conditions that the then German government - along with growth and stability pact - argued for at Maastricht? And if this then is true wouldn't the issuing of bonds require an amendment to the Treaty that has to be ratified by all 27 members? Or this just an urban myth?
Hi,
"I've one question about EU bonds. Doesn't the Maastricht Treaty explicitly forbid the ECB lending to member governments?"
Probably, but I am not talking about lending by the ECB. In fact I am not talking about lending at all. I am talking in the first place about the whole union (all 27 states, not just the eurozone) guaranteeing the bonds to maintain AAA rating, since I can see no point in countries who are already running out of money having to pay more interest.
This is simply a short term stop gap measure. Obviously we would then need to put this to all 27 members as you say (I'm not sure whether before or after). The interesting think at this point is that, apart from France perhaps, no one knows who needs help and who doesn't, it is certainly much more extensive than Italy and Greece. Maybe Germany and maybe the UK need help. So, while no one knows who will be hit then it is easier to get collective agreement.
And those who decide to stay outside will be free to do so, but they should be aware they may be eaten by the wolves. Better to stay near the campfire on a dark night.
Hi again,
"And if this then is true wouldn't the issuing of bonds require an amendment to the Treaty that has to be ratified by all 27 members?"
No. I've just checked, it doesn't need ratification, since it has already happened. Bonds were raised for the Hungary bailout in November. Article 119 of the treaty was used.
Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments either as a result of an overall disequilibrium in its balance of payments, or as a result of the type of currency at its disposal, and where such difficulties are liable in particular to jeopardise the functioning of the common market or the progressive implementation of the common commercial policy, the Commission shall immediately investigate the position of the State in question and the action which, making use of all the means at its disposal, that State has taken or may take in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
So the answer is yes, what you suggested was an urban legend.
Thanks for clearing things up Edward,
Obviously the key question then is that raised by your last point - what would any new and revised growth and stability pact have to contain? I assume it might mean more active management of trade imbalances between EU states - but how might this be achieved?
Hi,
"what would any new and revised growth and stability pact have to contain?"
Well a lot, including a fiscal straight jacket and growth oriented reforms for some states. For example, Italians won't be able to continue to retire at 60. Pension reform will be compulsory (just to give one example). And if the Italians don't like the sound of all this, then as I say, they can leave. But what we can't have is the whole thing falling apart by our sovereigns getting picked off one by one. The whole thing could then disintegrate into a mess.
Each of the points in my proposal will now be elaborated one by one in coming posts.
"I assume it might mean more active management of trade imbalances between EU states - but how might this be achieved?"
Actually this was one of the things I didn't have in mind, although the big CA deficit people will need to correct. There is no alternative to wage AND price deflation in these countries to restore competitiveness. This is why we aren't simply talking about free gravy here.
"There is no alternative to wage AND price deflation in these countries to restore competitiveness."
This is my most direct concern. Not so much Italy - because basically Italy is a wealthy country (though the extent to which public expenditure covers up huge economic failure in the Mezzogiorno does), and can stand deflation. But, I just don't think the political systems in a number of Central and Eastern European countries (I'll name them - Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) will survive even a short burst of deflation. And goodness knows what will happen then. How do we avoid this? Is there any really economic path that could be followed?
Hi,
"How do we avoid this? Is there any really economic path that could be followed?"
I understand your concerns completely. That is why I have included immediate euro membership for the Eastern countries in my proposals. I think there are things to do, but nothing will be easy, and we all need to work together. I will be trying to spell how I see things out in posts over the coming days and (I recommend) at the A Fistful Of Euros Blog.
Cheers, and good luck,
Edward
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