Sunday, May 11, 2008

Russia's Growing Inflation Headache

Russia's inflation rate rose to an annual 14.3 percent in April, the highest since April 2003, led by rising food costs. The inflation rate rose from 13.3 percent in March, while prices rose 1.4 percent in the month, compared with 1.2 percent in March, the Moscow-based Federal Statistics Service reported last week. Prices have already increased by 6.3 percent so far this year (January - April).



Food prices increased a monthly 2.2 percent in April, according to the statistics office. Bread prices rose 6.4 percent and sunflower oil prices increased 8.6 percent in the month.

Russia, which is the world's biggest energy exporter, is struggling in what now appears to be a vain attempt to reduce the inflation rate to 10 percent this year as food and energy prices and rising wages and living standards take what appear to be a relentless toll. Russia's inflation rate reached 11.9 percent in 2007, topping the government's 8.5 percent target rate by a good margin.


Letting The Ruble Rise



As a result of the difficulties which the Russian government are having containing prices speculation is now mounting that one of the first policy decisions Dmitry Medvedev take after he's sworn in as Russia's new president this week will be to allow a stronger currency.


Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank are forecasting the currency may rise by as much as 4 percent over the next six months. They suggest the central bank will come under increasing pressure to let the ruble appreciate to try to stem inflation even if it risks damping profits of oil and energy exporters, which according to Merrill Lynch currently fund more than half of the federal budget. The last time Bank Rossii allowed the ruble to strengthen was last August, when the inflation rate was "only" 8.5 percent. It's now up to 14.3 percent, and in all probability is still be rising.

The central bank attempts to "steer" the value of the ruble, setting the price against a currency basket made up of 0.55 dollars and 0.45 euros. It allowed the currency to appreciate against the basket three times last year, by a total of about 1.3 percent. The central bank also estimates the pass-through rate - or the rate at which and increase in the ruble would cut inflation - to be 0.3, that is to say a 1 percentage point increase in the ruble against the currency basket would cut inflation by 0.3 percentage points.

The downside of a stronger ruble for Rosneft is that it may diminish profit because half the oil produced by the company is sold into the dollar-denominated export market.

Interest rates aren't changes are thought not to as effective in controlling inflation in Russia as in more developed economies since Russia doesn't have a highly developed consumer-credit market, with mortgages and credit cards little-used outside larger cities, while the corporate sector has access to foreign currency denominated loans carrying lower interest rates which may not look especially risky given the background of potential ruble rises.

Many observers now fear that Russia is riding so high on rising oil and gas prices that it has little incentive to diversify economic activity beyond commodities. The energy industry produced more than two-thirds of the nation's export earnings and more than a third of the state's 2007 revenues, which totaled $315 billion.

The government has ignored advice from the World Bank and other organizations to invest in other industries, start-up companies and infrastructure. Instead, the central bank has amassed $530 billion in gold and foreign-currency reserves; Putin has put $130 billion of that in a sovereign-wealth fund that would provide no more than a two-year cushion if energy prices fall.

``This route may lead to a dead end,'' Economy Minister Elvira Nabiullina said at a Finance Ministry meeting last month. ``We no longer have the advantages of a cheap ruble, cheap labor'' after a decade of average annual economic growth of 7 percent that pushed up wages and the currency, making Russia less competitive.



Russia, the world's biggest energy exporter, has expanded an average of about 7 percent a year since President Vladimir Putin, 55, took office in 2000. During that time, the price of oil has risen almost fivefold to a record $119.93 a barrel. The economy will grow 6.6 percent this year, more than five times the 1.2 percent average of the G-7, according to Merrill Lynch.

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Spotlight On Hungary

Welcome to the Eastern Europe Economy Watch Blog. By clicking the older posts link (at the foot of the page) you will be able to leaf through the normal chronological blog posts. But first we have our country of the month feature where we would like to present some charts which provide background data we hope will help the first time reader better assess and get to grips with the general argument being presented on the blog. Below you will find charts for Hungarian male life expectancy, fertility, quarterly GDP growth, inflation, household demand, retail sales, and import and exports growth. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.

On the left you can see a chart for Hungarian male life expectancy, and on the right there is one showing Hungary's population development. Just why such factors are important, and need to be taken into account along with more standard macro economic data in order to understand what is currently happening in Hungary and what might subsequently spread across Central and

Eastern Europe can be discovered by reading my Hungary analysis:Just Why Is Hungary So Different From the Rest of the EU 10?The basic arguments being advanced here are that long term fertility and life expectancy do matter, since in the long run they condition the labour force and consumption patterns, and with these inflation and internal demand.



Above left you can see Hungarian ferility, and above right the evolution of the population median age, which are also key parameters, since they influence saving and consumption, and with these internal demand growth. On either side here you can see charts for inflationand quarterly GDP.


Next on the left we have a chart for recent movements in private internal consumption (which shows us the state of internal immediate consumption demand) while on the right we can see changes in constuction activity, (which serve as a nice proxy for fixed capital formation). Finally the chart on the bottom left shows a comparison of Hungary's trade balance 2006 and 2007,


while on the right you can see the evolution in non-forint mortgages for immediate consumption purposes. Arguably these are all the data points you need to understand my lengthy post on why we face a possible recession in Hungary, and why post-recession Hungary may be converted into yet another export dependent economy.


2008 Forecasts: The OECD in December revised their 2007 Hungary forecast down to 1.8%, and 2008 to 2.6%. These numbers are very hard to accept. I will be very surprised if we see calendar year 2000 as high as 1.8%, but more to the point 2.6% seems to be assuming a strong rebound, an assumption for which there is no real substantive evidence. In particular even to get what growth we have been getting in 2007 the Hungarian govenment has been running a deficit of around 6% of GDP. This is going to tighten yet further in 2008, so there is no supportive fiscal environment. And as I keep arguing, it is very hard to see a supportive monetary one. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook also put a similar figure of 2.7%, while the EU commission in November 2007 came in with the same 2.6% as the OECD.

Perhaps the prize for the most exaggerated prediction here must go to GKI Gazdaságkutató Zrt, who argue that Hungary should expect the incredible annual growth rate of 3.5%. My own view is much more nuanced. I think I am reasonably confident in holding to my recession forecast for 2008, although of course, "recession" does not mean negative growth for the whole year (technically it is simply 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth), so we might then go on to see what, between 0.5 and 1% growth over whole year 2008 (and the only really doubt is whether the contraction starts in Q4 2007, or in Q1 2008). But it is what happens in 2009 and 2010 that matters really, and at this point so many variables are in play (and interrelated ones to boot) that I can only say I envy those who have the courage - or the temerity - to stick their necks out). And of course, if we get a large correction in the value of the forint, then all those carefully weighed and weighted forecasts will, without a shadow of a doubt, go straight and directly off into the bin.