Spotlight On Hungary, January 2008

Welcome to the Eastern Europe Economy Watch Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first we have our country of the month feature where we would like to present some charts which provide background data which we hope will help the first time reader better assess and get to grips with the general argument being presented on the blog. Below you will find charts for Hungarian male life expectancy, fertility, quarterly GDP growth, inflation, household demand, retail sales, and import and exports growth. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.

On the left you can see a chart for Hungarian male life expectancy, and on the right there is one showing Hungary's population development. Just why such factors are important, and need to be taken into account along with more standard macro economic data in order to understand what is currently happening in Hungary and what might subsequently spread across Central and

Eastern Europe can be discovered by reading my Hungary analysis:Just Why Is Hungary So Different From the Rest of the EU 10?The basic arguments being advanced here are that long term fertility and life expectancy do matter, since in the long run they condition the labour force and consumption patterns, and with these inflation and internal demand.



Above left you can see Hungarian ferility, and above right the evolution of the population median age, which are also key parameters, since they influence saving and consumption, and with these internal demand growth. On either side here you can see charts for inflationand quarterly GDP.


Next on the left we have a chart for recent movements in private internal consumption (which shows us the state of internal immediate consumption demand) while on the right we can see changes in constuction activity, (which serve as a nice proxy for fixed capital formation). Finally the chart on the bottom left shows a comparison of Hungary's trade balance 2006 and 2007,


while on the right you can see the evolution in non-forint mortgages for immediate consumption purposes. Arguably these are all the data points you need to understand my lengthy post on why we face a possible recession in Hungary, and why post-recession Hungary may be converted into yet another export dependent economy.


2008 Forecasts: The OECD in December revised their 2007 Hungary forecast down to 1.8%, and 2008 to 2.6%. These numbers are very hard to accept. I will be very surprised if we see calendar year 2000 as high as 1.8%, but more to the point 2.6% seems to be assuming a strong rebound, an assumption for which there is no real substantive evidence. In particular even to get what growth we have been getting in 2007 the Hungarian govenment has been running a deficit of around 6% of GDP. This is going to tighten yet further in 2008, so there is no supportive fiscal environment. And as I keep arguing, it is very hard to see a supportive monetary one. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook also put a similar figure of 2.7%, while the EU commission in November 2007 came in with the same 2.6% as the OECD.

Perhaps the prize for the most exaggerated prediction here must go to GKI Gazdaságkutató Zrt, who argue that Hungary should expect the incredible annual growth rate of 3.5%. My own view is much more nuanced. I think I am reasonably confident in holding to my recession forecast for 2008, although of course, "recession" does not mean negative growth for the whole year (technically it is simply 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth), so we might then go on to see what, between 0.5 and 1% growth over whole year 2008 (and the only really doubt is whether the contraction starts in Q4 2007, or in Q1 2008). But it is what happens in 2009 and 2010 that matters really, and at this point so many variables are in play (and interrelated ones to boot) that I can only say I envy those who have the courage - or the temerity - to stick their necks out). And of course, if we get a large correction in the value of the forint, then all those carefully weighed and weighted forecasts will, without a shadow of a doubt, go straight and directly off into the bin.

Tuesday, March 4, 2008

Estonia Retail Sales January 2008, and Sweden's Banks in the Baltics

According to Statistics Estonia retail sales grew at a 1% annual rate (in constant prices, ie real terms) in January 2008 when compared to January 2006. The growth rate of retail sales has been decelerated significantly during the last part of 2007 - as can be seen in the chart below - and this deceleration has now continued into January 2008. We have no sign at this point of any slowdown in the rate of deceleration, and if things continue like this we will evidently enter the contraction phase as of February.



Basically, if you keep following this blog you will one day get to see when a process of sharp deceleration finally gets to "bottom out", but that day evidently has not yet arrived.

On another front the Swedish banking sector is evidently begining to notice the wear and tear associated with its exposure in the Baltics. We have already reported on the decision by Moody's Investors Service to cut its ratings for Estonian banks on concerns of "weakening asset quality due to high exposure to the cooling property market". Moody's assigned a negative outlook to Estonian banks, including AS Sampo Pank, fully owned by Danske Bank A/S, and Balti Investeeringute Grupi Pank AS. This followed hard on the heels of their decision on Jan. 18 to lower the outlook of AS Hansapank, the top Baltic lender and a fully owned unit of Swedbank AB, to ``negative'' from ``stable.'' Hansapank accounts for more than half of Estonia's banking industry assets.

At the end of last week, in a revealing article in the Financial Times entitled Uneasy Calm At Sweden's Banks, David Ibison argued that all is not as straightforward as it seems in Sweden's banking system, and one of the reasons it isn't is the exposure out in the Baltics.

At the same time, the share prices of two of the banks – SEB and Swedbank – have been hit hard over misplaced concerns over their exposure to the emerging Baltic markets of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Particular attention is being paid to the depressed valuation of Swedbank, whose Baltic operations are conducted by Hansabank, a wholly owned subsidiary.

Fears of a sharp slowdown in the Baltics and a related contraction in bank lending to the housing market have sparked worries that Hansabank will suffer and that its problems could have a knock-on effect on Swedbank.

At Swedbank's current price, Hansabank is valued at almost nothing, in spite of the fact there are no signs of problems with its Baltic loan book, which is well capitalised and where non-performing loans are well in hand.

Ronit Ghose, an analyst at Citigroup, said: "Hansabank has gone from a multiple in the mid teens to close to zero . . . The market is taking a negative view of these countries and of Swedbank's share price and is overlooking the positives."



Finally, and for those of you interested in comparative charts and urban legends, here is a retail sales comparison for Latvia and Estonia (Latvian retail sales actually declined slightly in January).



Now I mention urban legends here, since I think that in the Baltic context we have had two:

1/ The Baltic countries were so small that Nordic banks would have no difficulty keeping them supplied with funds, so there wasn't too much to worry about.

2/ Estonia was running along the same path as Latvia, only one year ahead (or was that behind?).

The first of these legends, as is shown by the material posted above, is now evidently false, the Nordic banks are now going to have to think very carefully about every move they make in the Baltics.

And the second also looks to me to be a bit ridiculous when you look at the two charts for retail sales movement, since what is striking is how similar they are, and given the level of external trade interlocking, and hence the dependence of export performance on internal demand in the other, this shouldn't surprise us terribly. Latvia's downturn is accelerating slightly more rapidly at this point than Estonia's, but the difference is secondary, and not one of substance. Certainly the credit crunch must have been applied at roughly the same moment last spring in both countries, and now a very similar process is working its way through the two systems. And in neither case, it seems, do the political authorities have any sort of coherent emergency "plan B" to deal with what is now an all too evident emerging eventuality.

And for those of you who are addicted to comparative charts, here is the latest EU economic sentiment indicator for the Baltic states. Here we can see that it is the case, Estonia did take off downwards rather earlier than Latvia, but Latvia has been fast catching up, while in the last couple of months sentiment in Estonia does seem to have stabilised. Whether or not this stabilisation constitutes an early indicator of "bottoming out" we will get to see over the next couple of months from the real data as it comes in. Certainly one to watch for. On the other hand it does seem that Lithuania WAS a "late developer" which is now also, and in its turn, in the process of catching up.

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